American involvement in Vietnam began with providing advisors for 2 years. Through the administration of five U.S. Presidents and 10 years of intervention in the region, U.S. military roles expanded to meet the mounting challenges. Thus, U.S support as a process slowly transitioned from merely providing general war-time assistance to ever more comprehensive avenues of support to the Republic of Vietnam. Although our assistance began with sending a few advisors, even this initial commitment increased to approximately 16,000 advisors that included U.S. military instructors to train South Vietnamese Army ground-combat troops; U.S. Army and Marine Special Forces to foster development of South Vietnam's own Special Force units; U.S. Air Force aircraft, aviation pilots, and aviation instructors to instruct new South Vietnamese aviation pilot-candidates; and the necessary U.S. personnel to provide guidance and leadership to the South Vietnamese to develop their own fleet-air Navy.
Notable in this process is the fact that it was no small matter adapting and transitioning a primarily agrarian culture to a modern world-view. Practicalities began with the most fundamental of education since many of the South Vietnamese (and those who fled South from the communists) were illiterate -- unable to read or write in their own language. The next step focused on developing basic military order and discipline within these developing troops. This was followed by practical training in military practices such as effectively overcoming personal fears, emotional and psychological strengthening, standardized ethical conduct, as well as strategic and tactical planning. As the process continued, this base-line training was followed by providing instruction and practice in initial and advanced skillsets for combat using U.S. military equipment, weapons, and supplies. Admist each step leadership training was equally taught as a vital component, and opportunities were routinely provided for leadership development and practice.
As Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam,
Admiral Zumwalt defined the roles of the Navy, assessed Navy personnel needs, and determined logistical support required to
achieve the objectives.
Additional formidable challenges were posed in the process of U.S. assistance to foster development of the Republic of Vietnam's own professional military units since Vietnam had been occupied for centuries, and the lives of most Vietnamese people had tyically focused upon activities associated with subsistence farming using water baffalo and oxen for planting rice, harvesting rice and fruits by hand, coupled with limited fishing to support their own families. The most significant exposure to the larger world experienced by the vast majority of South Vietnamese people was the periodic exchange of their extra goods at the nearest local market where they were likely to arrive via small, slender, family-made traditional wood boats. This unchanged rural indigenous lifestyle was anchored in an extended family atmosphere -- as they clustered together beneath thatched huts for generations without electricity nor modern conveniences.
VIETNAM'S LIMITED UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY. Greatly complicating the smooth transition of the Republic of Vietnam into a democracy were the factors that the political perspectives of Vietnam's general population, its local chiefs, and its rising political leaders were based on centuries of domination (often in corruption or biased for self-absorbed interests) by other countries; therefore, the region's comprehension of democracy was very limited. Without a prior healthy and good model demonstrating a balance of human rights, values based on fairness, a judicial system, as well as an understanding of personal and government responsibilities the task of emulating these qualities provided by the U.S. proved even harder. Yet many of the Vietnamese people and their leaders had reached a point of desiring and seeking independence, even though their concept of independence was frought with trail-and-error as well as lessons-learned. As a consequence of the unanticipated length of time that it required to assist The Republic of Vietnam to cultivate and adopt the ways and practices of democracy -- coupled with the ineffectiveness of a succession of its political leaders -- U.S. White House policy-decisions shifted from a support/training mode to a direct action mode to expedite the process.
U.S. Military Interventions in Vietnam Provide Specific Successes:
Yet Major Factors Degrade Overall U.S. Effectiveness
Based on the extended amount of time required to appropriately train indiginous troops of the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. President's Johnson and Nixon contributed major air bombing offensives to the effort that committed U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine, and U.S. Naval air and fleet operations. These American aircrews took direct responsibility for the tasks of engaging and neutralizing targets, transporting troops, providing medevac care, refueling aircraft, and efforts that prevented the logistial and resupply of materials and troops to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong communist insurgents. These air, land, and sea efforts -- identified as Operation Rolling Thunder and Operations Linebacker I and II -- were sporatic over years. These operations were micromanged by the White House rather than sustained to a point of military success; and this micromanagement greatly diminished their effectiveness.
USAF F-105 Thunderchiefs were a workhorse, with over 20,000 raids in the Vietnam war, and especially adept at neutralizing surface-to-air missile sites.
The outcomes of these specific operations were mixed since pilots successfully achieved their objectives and neutralized or destroyed all their targets. This was a joint-effort of fighter/bombers piloted by U.S. Navy, Marine, and Air Force crews and supplemented by Army helicopter crews as well. Each provided distinctly different strengths, capabilities, and missions. However, the North Vietnamese had ample time in between bombing-runs to rebuild, re-route, and even be fully prepared using sophisticated surface-to-air missile launches and mobile artillary in response to the next predicatable resumption of bombings that were authorized by the U.S. White House. U.S. forces were tightly constrained to a narrow corridor of time and airspace by specific Presiential decisions that personally determined every target, date of operation, time, and even further micromanaged every detail. This micromanagement from afar -- not by seasoned and informed military leaders but by Presidents Johnson and Nixon -- resulted in over 1,100 aircraft shot down or destoroyed during these operations. The human cost of these specific air operations alone (not including life lost during close-air support to ground troops) resulted in 382 American aircrew dead. An additional 702 aircrew (primarily pilots) were Missing in Action -- most of whom were shot down and became Prisoners of War or later confirmed as dead.
The all-weather USAF B-52 Stratofortress has a history of prompting adversaries to return to negotiations.
MAJOR U.S. AIR BOMBINGS SUCCESSFULLY NEUTRALIZED NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS; YET COMMUNIST TROOP MORALE REMAINED AT A HIGH. Although the air bombing-runs successfully destroyed North Vietnamese military bases as well as airfields, key infrastructures, ammunition and oil storage areas, transportation centers, bridges, and war-related factories, their overall effectiveness was diminished by several additional realities. First, in spite of the physical damage to the war-making components of North Vietnam, morale of North Vietnamese communists remained surprisingly high. In large part this was due to the structure of the Communist Party that maintains separation and co-authority shared in the field between military field commanders and "political commissars.". Political commissars were embedded within each battalion and served in a role similar to a morale coach, a chaplain, and a social worker. They were direct representatives of the Communist Party and were hand-selected for their revolutionary orientation and unwavering allegiance to the Party. Before every military operation Party commissars clearly outlined the goals, accomplishments, and plans; and in a like manner they were able to rouse the spirits of troops, provide resources to uplift troop unity/recovery/resilience, as well as reinforce troop cultural identity and values. In addition to these efforts that supported general morale of their military perssonnel as a whole, commissars were also responsible for providing very individualized support to any soldier experiencing hardships. This distinct delineation and co-sharing of power between the commissars and military senior leaders was performed in strict accordance with Marxist-Leninst protocols (based on an inherent distrust by Communist Party leaders of military power and any potential coups).
USN & USMC A-4 Skyhawk fighter/bombers launched from carrier platforms provided legendary assets based on their speed, power, versitility, and ability to own the air space. They exccelled in air-to-air dogfights, delivery of diverse payloads, air-to-ground attack, as well as close air support to protect U.S. and coalition troops.
COMMUNISTS WERE PREPARED FOR THE LONG-TERM EFFORT REQUIRED TO CONQUER SOUTH VIETNAM. Additional factors contributing to why U.S. efforts were ineffective in Vietnam became evident at the end of the war since communists were committed to achieve their goals of transforming all of Vietnam into a unified communist nation as a long-range goal, not merely a short-term objective. Therefore, they were fully prepared for slow, steady progress, and were fully oriented to accomplish their objective however long that would take. During discussions by U.S. leaders with North Vietnamese leaders at the conclusion of U.S. interventions, Vietnamese leaders smugly underscored their objective was merely to prolong the war through any and every means, knowing that ultimately the United States would go home (as other countries had done) and withdraw much if not all its support to South Vietnam.
COMMUNIST TROOPS RECEIVE SUPPORTS FROM NORTH VIETNAM, THE SOVIETS, AND CHINA WHILE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE DEGRADED & REVILED BY AMERICAN PUBLIC. As U.S. intervention expanded to include escalations of ground-level troops deployed to Vietnam, the conflicts displayed on American streets worsened. Communist troops received morale boosts and psychologial support continuously in their duty assignments not only in their combat units but also through numerous channels of the North Vietnamese communist government. Additionally, they were regularly honored for their efforts as major contributions toward fulfilling the goals of the Communist Party mission by both the Soviet and Chinese governments.
As U.S. intervention expanded to include escalations of ground-level troops deployed to Vietnam, the conflicts displayed on American streets worsened. Instead of even offering basic respect to U.S. military personnel for their sacrifices, U.S. men and women in uniform were routinely regarded as mere murderous cogs in "the military industrial complex" by demonstrators and protestors back home; and the American public frequently openly reviled U.S. military personnel. Furthermore, even their civilian counterparts in civil-government roles -- who provided intelligence operations, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy -- met with a similar fate by the anti-war/anti-government/anti-establishment sentiment displayed in communities and at universities. As a consequence those who performed their duty to their nation and endured countless sacrifices on behalf of U.S. citizens -- and who likewise sacrificed to support the goals of freedom for the South Vietnamese citizens -- received little support (and inadequate budget for their missions) from either the U.S. Presidents or U.S. Congress/Senate during most of the Vietnam War.
Chants and placards often reviled U.S. military personnel during the Vietnam War -- calling them "killers," "imperialists," "murderers," "baby killers," and "losers." Upon their return home, men and women in uniform were frequently met (individually and collectiely) with jeers or those who spat in their face.
As only one of many incidents, when Navy aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitize entered port, large crowds of protestors awaited atop the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. In accord with Navy traditions, sailors stood formally shoulder-to-shoulder in their dress white uniforms at the ships rail, excited to be home. However, their "welcome home" consisted of protestors dumping buckets of urine and feces on them as the ship passed beneath the bridge.
U.S. Veterans Affairs clinical research reveals that the highest rate of post traumatic stress occurred for military personnel serving in the Vietnam War era compared to other war eras. The lack of public support for military personnel during the Vietnam era and for veterans of this era took its toll during the war and for decades thereafter. The lack of support (from the government, universities, employiers, community, and families) greatly reduced opportunities for individuals to be appreciated for their sacrifices, adjust, heal, rebuild resilience, and usher in a smooth transition and reintegration back into civilian life. Equally notable is the fact the suicide rate of Vietnam Era veterans remains astronomically high (for the same reasons) in comparison with other wars in which Americans have served.
Two U.S. Presidents Disregard Miliary Expertise and Seasoned Experience
PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON INHERITS A WAR HE NEVER WANTED AND REJECTS ANALYSIS BY MILITARY EXPERTS. After the tragic assassination of President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson assumed the mantle of Executive Leadership of the nation, and freely stated this was a war he never wished to be engaged in. However, in spite of this fact, he chose to micro-manage the war due to complications of the Cold War with the Soviets. Vietnam was deeply negatively impacted by White House decisions that tightly restrained military efforts due to fear of how the Soviets and China might respond. President Johnson's assumptions were that if the American effort was perceived as "too aggressive" by foreign adversaries in Vietnam, then nuclear war might evolve as an impulsive response from either North Vietnam, the Soviets, or China. Although that perspective has merit, actual war-time analysis by U.S. military advisors, analysis by independent well-esteemed U.S. "think tanks," and perspectives of many in the Congress and Senate were not sought, valued, nor considered by President Johnson. Instead, personal assumptions prevailed. What appears evident from historical documentation is that these assumptions and this view served merely as a smokescreen and excuse for a lack of developing effective Executive policies as they related to the Vietnam War effort.
President Johnson became increasingly stressed over the Vietnam War, and equally depressed that the war was taking so much of his time and focus away from The Great Society he wished to create as his contribution and legacy during his administration.
President Johnson had envisioned that his primary attention during his administration would focus on domestic issues and his earnest intention to create "The Great Society." However, he inherited the Vietnam War; and his cabinet members and Pentagon advisors record that he frequently displayed frustration, anger, and resentment that the war was overshadowing his time and focus in office, as well as became the focus of the American public. Consequently, others close to him also note, his attention was not on the war to the degree that would have been beneficial, but instead continued to pursue his own interests for what he desired "his legacy" to be. As his administration was nearing its conclusion, the Paris peace talks finally were coming to an agreement; and Johnson believed if this could be achieved, his re-election would have a higher chance of succeeding and he would then have the opportunity to invest much more time, energy, and the American public's attention to expand his programs for a "Great Society." With the anticipated signing of the peace agreement, plans were also established to withdraw all Ameraican troops from South Vietnam in 60 days.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
GREAT SOCIETY PROGRAMS
Sweeping legislative policies enacted in Johnson's Presidential term:
Establishment of Medicare and Medicaid; reduced poverty; increased opportunities & programs for the poor; outlawed racial discrimination; strengthened racial civil rights; added Federal wilderness areas, supported public educational television and radio broadcasting; and supported creation of model mass transit programs,
PRESIDENT NIXON'S SELF-ABSORPTION, DISTRUST, AND THE DEADLY DANGER OF HIS INSULATED VIEWS. As both a Presidential candidate and as serving as President, President Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, did place considerable attention on the war. However, he regarded the war from the viewpoint of how it could benefit him personally. His decisions were based upon an unbalanced approach to "win the war" focused entirely on short-term objectives that related directly to applying this perception of winning the war under his leadership to achieve his first election and his subsequent re-election. As evidence, confirmed by White House tape recordings (and documentation by his Chief of Staff, H.R. Halderman), Richard Nixon sought out and created a secret "back door channel" to communicate with the Republic of South Vietnam's President Nguyen van Thieu through his aide Anna Chennault, a pro-nationalist Chinese lobbyist. By this interference during the Presidential campaign against President Johnson Presidential candidate Nixon sabotaged the Paris Peace talks -- where a peace agreement was impending and anticipated prior to the election. In fact, all appearances were that the war would end before the election; and U.S. troops would return home by the election. However, through the back-door channel directly to President Thieu, Nixon communicated through Ms. Chennault that he strongly believed he would win the election and he convinced President Thieu not to accept the peace agreement since he assured Thieu that he would give him a better deal when he assumed the Presidency. After carefully considering this offer, President Thieu chose not to attend the peace conference meeting, and therefore the peace agreement was not signed and this opportunity to end the war failed.
During the election campaign process during President Johnson's administration, Richard Nixon secretly creates a "back channel" to the President of the Republic of South Vietnam through Anna Chennault -- a nationalist-Chinese-lobbiest -- in order to thwart the Vietnam War peace process. Nixon's election strategy was dependent upon him ending the war, not Johnson; and he successfully sabotaged the impending peace agreement.
Compared to criminal charges that President Nixon later faced regarding Watergate, these actions of "the Nixon-Chennault Affair" were clear grounds for treason and would have been punishable as acts of treason. However, these facts were known by few, and only came available to American public decades after the impeachment hearings of the President and his subsequent resignation. Although Richard Nixon had the experience, intellect, and drive that could lead to a highly successful Presidential legacy, his penchant for criminal behaviors outweighed and consummed both his Presidential terms in office. Furthermore, what is known now from the historical perspective is that his strategies, tactics, behaviors, choices, and actions illustrate a complete disregard for life by extending the war by many years -- a tragedy that impacted millions of military personnel and the Vietnamese people very personally, as well as inflicted countless sufferings on the communities and families involved.
If the U.S. Congress & Senate had known that Nixon sabotaged the Vietnam peace talks, this evidence would be clear grounds for treason. However, these facts were not revealed until decades later through tape recordings and direct documentation by H.R. Haldeman (Nixon's White House Chief of Staff) that were discoverd in the Johnson and Nixon Libraries.
XXXXXXuring President Nixon's administrations, the Congressional hearings revealed that instead of choosing what beneficial for the U.S. as a nation and decisions that would have supported democracy as a whole in the world. Furthermore, neither of these two Presidents chose to fulfil U.S. commitments to support the Republic of South Vietnam as a democratic nation in such a way as to be successful. Instead, they utilized the position and respnsibilities of the leadership of the free world for their own personal self-serving intentions. LEADERSHIP decisions that related to tHE WAR, as well as foreign and domestic policy based on self-absorbed self-benefit. XXXX
The frustration of Admiral Zumwalt and other U.S. military leaders during this period reflected their understanding of the legitimate opportunities to end the war through a combination of both military and diplomatic means. Those in these leadership positions noted that numberous opportunities arose that could have legimately ended the war and reduced the loss of life on all sides. Additionally, military leaders were further frustrated since they had a good working relationship with both President Thieu and those of his government in addtion to equally good relationships with the various military branches of the Republic of Vietnam -- military units that the U.S. had professionally trained and that they had seen had witnessed as more capable of providing a greater degree of their own nation's safety and security. Admiral Zumwalt was therefore among those who were fully committed to provide training to the Republic of Vietnam within a peaceful but stabilizing structure that would permit that nation to engage in free elections and support their country's transition into a more stable democratic atmosphere.
White House Policies Fail to Defend Against Foreign Adversary Interference in the United States:
Communist-Socialist-Terrorist Influences Fuel U.S. Social Strife
COMMUNIST LEADERS OF NORTH VIETNAM, U.S.S.R, AND CHINA EXPLOITED U.S. SOCIAL STRIFE TO SUPPORT THEIR OWN AGENDAS. The intense social and ideological strife during the era of the Vietnam War created the foundation that the Communist Party historically seeks and found in the United States as fertile ground not only to seed their perspectives and propaganda, but also to inspire willing recruits through diverse doors. Historically, communist leaders target existing social rifts rather than initiate those rifts; and they found a wide spectrum of opportunities to engage in with various social groups and over a continuous period during the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, their leadership concentrated on increasing discord through carefully crafted psychological warfare combined with public events designed to attract the media. Professional paid Communist Party agitators and communist/socialist sympathizes historically are enlisted by communist leaders to exacerbate social discord and division through orchestrated "street theater." Such "theater" provides the public attention they seek to increase support to their cause. The Vietnam War era proved to be a very rewarding period for communist efforts in the United States; and their leadership was highly successful in exascerbating the chaos that has traditionally formed the basis for violent revolutuions that have in fact sometimes successfully overthrown existing governments.
The environment within the United States at the time was one of tremendous division between races, cultures, ethnic traditions, political party agendas, philosophical ideals, religious differeneces, sexual preferences, age-generation divides, and even gender issues. Likewise, there was a home-front battlefield among the Amerian public between three distinct major segments within the population: One segment was comprised of an extreme segment of the populace that included communists, communist-socialist sympathizers, anti-war/anti-government/anti-authority/anti-establishment and counter-culture components; another segment was comprised of those who were centrists and moderates and who therefore supported social change within the structure of Constitutional Law and order; and the third segment consisted of those who staunchly advocated for a conservative law and order governing framework as a response to the chaos in the streets. The prevelance of illicit drug use by a significant portion of Americans during this time-frame -- including frequent or addictive use of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and mind-altering psychodelic drugs such as LSD -- deeply influenced both perceptions and actions. Consequently, such drug use further fueled disagreements, devisiveness, and often spawned group/mob rage and violence. It was a time of extremes, where leaders of many groups encouraged and incited violence as a strategic means to initiate the social revolution they envisioned; and their concpets, rhetoric, and actions idealized and romaticized violence by which they believed they would bring about their own ultimate power and contol over others. In large part, the leaders of many of these social movements had strong allegiences to the Marxist-Leninist Communist agendas of either Mao or Stalin as their preference, and they expressed it openly in their rhetoric, documented propaganda, as well as in demonstations and organized protests.
During the Vietnam War, Students for a Democratic Society -- originating from a merger of the League for Industrial Democracy (a Socialist organization) and the Communist National Student League -- became a central force and instrumental in providing what became known as "teach-ins" to spread their philosophy across university campuses in the United States. It was this organization more than any other at the time that engaged in effective demonstrations to garner public support, media attention, and a growing membership to adopt their methods and mission. The SDS attracted many individuals who supported a variety of causes via their "teach-ins" (which provided propaganda/communications to upwards of 20,000 and even 36,000 university students at a time), and thereby provided effective instruction designed to entice and enlist new- comers to their Marist-Leninist political doctrines and objectives. The Weatlhermen -- a violent revolutioary faction of SDS -- ultimately superseded the initial leadership of SDS and took the initiative to bring the varius chapters together from across the U.S. and likewise brought together many of the social change groups (such as Black Panthers) under one ideiological umbrella. The Weathermen (later renamed Weather Underground) were focused on action exclusively in the form of terrorist activities; and their members went "underground" to escape accountability from law enforcement, the courts, and prison for their frequent bombings which destroyed Federal and State properties, military and university facilities, and resulted in murdering and injuring innocent victims. Favorite targets of the Weather Underground were locations where U.S. military could be found -- the U.S. Navy Recruting Command and military enlistment processing centers; recruiting offices; military bases and air stations; military vehicles of recruiting personnel; the Pentagon; the State Department in Washington DC, ROTC facilities at campuses, and military research projects funded at universities. One circumstance that was a bomb designed to explode during a dance where 300 non-commissioned officers were gathering that night with their dates.
The leadership changes within Students for a Democratic Society vascilated in their core principles based in Marxist-Leninist political doctrines. Their political ideologies argued between strategies and tactics that would create a violent revolution in the United States via the philosophical and functional methodologies employed by Trotskyism, Stalinism, and Maoism.
Ultimately, the SDS re-branded itself through the leadership that became known as the Weathermen and the Weather Underground. This further transformed the organization into a purely violent revolutionary model dedicated exclusively to accomplishing their goals through terrorist activities.
The SDS and Weather Underground's own published communications boasted that their leaders met repeatedly with North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese Communist Pary leaders as well as with Che Guevara (Communist revolutionaly guerrilla leader who successfully orchestrated violent revolutions in various global regions). These meetings are also confirmed by declassified FBI reports. The discussions in these hard-core communist environments in North Vietnam, U.S.S.R., and China are recorded as concentrating on strategies and tactics to employ in the United States in order to facilitate a violent revolution in America. Collectively, these leaders decided that the one common vehicle that would most likely lead to success to initiate a violent revolution on a scale capable of overthrowing American democracy and democratic institutions would be by spearheading opposition to the Vietnam War as their chief overall focalpoint. By this strategy they projected that they would be able to accomplish two missions: First, significantly influencing the outcome of the war in Vietnam so as to unite both North and South Vietnam under the complete authority of the Communist Party; and secondly to overthrow the U.S. democratic government and replace it with communism.
The SDS, Weathermen, and Weather Underground leadership adopted the same approach as that employed by North Vietnamese Communist leader, Ho Chi Mingh when deciding between ideological differences and Marxist-Lenist frame-works to overthrow an existing government. Wishing to alienate neither the Soviets or China, Ho Chi Mingh and SDS therefore embraced aspects of both political ideologies to ensure receipt of the benefis, money, resources, and support from the Soviets and China to fulfill all their own end-game objectives.
In the philsophy of the SDS and Weathermen, the end justififes the means; therefore through a carefully crafted process they transitioned a great many Americans through use of their slogans and methodologies toward the conviction that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and that the goals for their specific causes could only -- and would only -- meet with success through violence in the streets in a pitched battle between the people and the government. Specifically, their leaders violently opposed the war as it applied specifically to Vietnam and they likewise opposed the U.S. military objectives that focused on assisting the Republic of South Vietnam retain its sovernty as a democracy. This was contrasted with their objectives that encouraged and incited violence on the streets of the United States in their stated goal to overthrow U.S. governing institutions and democratic practices. Yet this philosophical conundrum did not deter the leaders of the SDS, Weathermen, nor many of the revolutionary leaders of social change groups from their intent to cultivate atmospheres of violence in order to achieve the utopia they portrayed in their propaganda. In fact, these leaders often cited the revolutionary effectiveness of these violent tactics in Communist China and the U.S.S.R to illustrate their success. However, what was not examined (nor encouraged to examine) at the time of these Chinese and Soviet revolutions or thereafter is that historical evidence reveals that governance by communist principles and practices has not led to these envisioned utopias; and instead such approaches have consistently led to increased suppression of human rights and considerable suffering among its societies.
The Vietnam War -- inclusive of American anti-war, anti-government sentiment -- evolved as the common thread by which communist-socialist leaders linked diverse social change groups in the United States into a larger context and network. In this process, merely a strategy to single out the war was not enough, nor was it enough to discredibt the U.S. government as a whole. Instead, devaluing and delegitimizing democratic institutions and Constitutional Laws also became a propaganda means of demeaning their worth and encouraging an overthrow of every symbol of authority. To personalize this even further, communist-socialist leaders and their sympathizers evaluated that they needed to put a face to the name and "crimes against the people," therefore they also focused on those who were engaged in the war itself, that is, U.S. military men and women -- who they targeted as perpetuators of the war and the soruce of Evil. This strategy -- devised by Che Guevara in combination with the North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese leadership -- employed this as skillful psycholotical warfare. It proved successful in Communist propaganda in order to blame, degrade, invalidate, and, when possible, shame and humiliate military personnel -- individually and collectively. These same propaganda sources concentrated on painting U.S. military personnel as "losers" and "baby killers" in the eyes of the American public, and utilized every opportunity to create mis-information and dis-information of military successess or concerns into failures, disgraces, and "losses." An additional strategy empoyed by communist-socialist leaders in America at the time "weaponized" their membership by encouraging individuals drafted into U.S. military service to engage in these same discrediting practices from within to disrupt military actions in every way possible from inside the institutional structure. In this way, U.S. military personnel also became scapegoats for the White House policies (and lack of policies) that created and sustained the Vietnam War. Furthermore, with the horrors of war televisioned on the evening news every night as well as in docoumenaries, the American public saw for the first time what war looks like in real-time; and Socialist-Communist leaders encouraged and inspired social groups to focus on this opportunity to use the nation's attention for their own social cause and benefit TO END U.S. SUPPORT TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND EASY RESPONSE
The beliefs and dogma of the SDS, the Weathermen, and each of the diverse social change groups that advocated for violent overthrow of the "establishment" significantly influenced the American pubic's view of not only the war but also of those who served in it. Such chaos and division in the streets -- reported daily in the news across the nation -- became a focalpoint for "change" in every aspect of American life. Consequently, this backdrop became the last thing American military enlistees saw on their way to serving in Vietnam and was the same or similar (and in many cases worse) scenario to which they personally returned where they themselves became a scapegoat for failed policies of the U.S. Executive and Legislative processes. Furthermore, in large part, Congression/Senatorial response at the time was one of inertia or parallysis -- where they exhibited a resistence to creating legislation in an apparent fear of voter retaliation in their next elections.
Exploiting the tensions within America even more, the Anarchist movement arose in America during the Vietnam War. This movement targeted America's youth as recruits (where anyone over 30 was the enemy) and encouraged them to cast aside all "traditional" political ideologies. Instead they romanticized and promoted complete "freedom" that they defined as destruction of all forms and sources of authority. Their propaganda promotes the concept that to achieve "true independence" they must destroy any ability for oversight, accountability, or consequences for personal choices. As a philosophy, the Anarchist movement endorses a complete lack of pro-social conduct or society responsibilities. Instead, the Anarchist Credo focuses on direct ACTION, and boasts of its capacity to destroy any form of law and order in order to perpetuate the chaos -- founded upon terorism -- that is its cornerstone.
In addtion to fomenting social strife intended to spark a violent revolution by the people, the collaborative efforts -- of communist leaders and communist sympathizes, their splinter-groups under their umbrella, in addition to those engaged in the Anarchist movmement --sharply focused their efforts on discrediting U.S. government agencies, democratic institutions, and the U.S. military itself. Anti-war anti-establishment sentiments and the discord among so many groups (that were united in some aspects and yet were conflicting among themselves in other aspects) created violent confrontations that spilled out routinely onto American streets not only in major cities but across the entire spectrum of the American landscape. These conflicts ultimately resulted in President Johnson resigning from the U.S. Presidency, and Richard Nixon was voted in as President on a platform of ending the war coupled with a law and order platform.
The
Anarchist Cookbook was widely distributed through mainstream bookstores and at universities during the Vietnam War era. It was not only "the bible" of those who formed the Anarchist movement but also of communist sympathizers and those of the American counter-culture. The "cookbook" provided not only a philosophigal framework but also specific guidance for direct action through the engagement of criminal acts. This included the manufacture of illicit drugs and drug-trafficing for project funding purposes; extensive descriptions and use of weapons; and detailed instructions for manuafcturing bombs and an array of other explosive devises for the purposes of creating and perpetuating terrorism.
ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S CONTRIBUTION WITHIN THE U.S. SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE CONTEXT OF THE REALITIES OF THE TIME. During this historical time-frame Admiral Zumwalt held increasingly higher and more comprehensive responsibilities as the Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam followed by promotion to the position of Chief of Naval Opeations (the highest Navy leadership position) and serving as one of the Presidential Military Joint Chiefs of Staff. Given the dissent that presented itself not only in American society but also affecting individuals within the military, the Admiral chose wisely to work with the realities that existed rather than ignoring, denying, or opposing them. He based his decisions on four key responsibilities: First, employment of the powers granted to him in both a personal and professional way that best support and embody American core principles and values. Second, safeguarding American citizens and America's democratic processes, Constitutional Law, and institutions. Third, contributing to U.S. efforts to assist the Republic of South Vietnam to remain independent as a democractic nation and contribute toward facilitating that country's stability. Fourth, improving the structure and creating policies of the U.S. Navy by no less than total transformation of it as a vehicle for positive change -- as an inclusive, fair, American institution composed of the highest quality professionals.
White House Dereliction of Duty:
Lack of Guiding Policy & Strategy in Response to Communist Threats
to Overthrow Democratic Governments
Although mililtary and diplomatic experts (at the time as well as after the war) cited several significant junctures where U.S. efforts could have realistically ended the Vietnam war and realistially brokered successful efforts for the freedom of South Vietnam (both in Peace Agreements and militarily), the decisions of the U.S. Excecutive and Legislative administration did not choose these options. Instead White House choices were made that continued on a path that extended the war. Not seizing the opportuniites presented created much frustration by miliatary leadership, lowered the morale of U.S. toops, and served as a detriment to the Republic of South Vietnam. Furthermore, the Congress/Senate chose not to employ its oversight and decison-making capabilities in these matters.
Foreign relations experts, political and presidential historians, political strategists, scholars, and senior esteemed military leaders provide their analysis based on comprehensive data collected from all sides after the war. Although the complexities of this war are well worth the study by anyone interested in war and peace, these subject-matter-experts conclude the fundamental basis of why the U.S. found itself in a quadmire was due to the fact that none of the five U.S. Commander-and-Chiefs had defined an overall guiding policy and strategy to effective respond to communist threats to overthrow democratic governments (including protection for the United States). As an outcome of this deficit to produce a guiding policy, U.S. presidents also failed to develop an exit strategy to the war in Vietnam until it became directly politically expedient and personally beneficial to themselves.
False Perceptions Contrast with Reality
From the highest Executive government level, the U.S. conducted its interventions in Vietnam based on "attrition," -- a simplistic body-count of enemy found dead as a statistic provided to the President rather than Presesidential consultation with its U.S. and coalition military experts in the region. For this reason Presidents Johnson and Nixon defined "victory" based on the numbers of the enemy dead in contrast to other measures that reflect success. Consequently, White House policy functioned from the assumtion that dessimating the North Vietnamese troops would directly translate to convincing the communists to give up the fight. For similar reasons, it was also believed that such a "victory" by numbers would also immediately "win" and maintain the independence of South Vietnam as a continuing Republic. This proved to be a very unrealistic and simplistic view. Instead, reality proved that even at the height of the Vietnam War -- when 20 North Vietnamese Army regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas died for every one American or South Vietnamese -- there remained a seemingly never-ending fresh supply of fervent communists (provided by China) into the fray.
With the White House administration still cliniging to false assumptions, disrupting and interfering with the supply chain that provided fresh troops and supplies to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerillas became the next fixation by U.S. Presidents in order to reduce the military effectiveness of the communists. The primary access points for resupplying the communists within the South Vietnam region were through two sources. One primary source of supplies arrived via the coastline bordering both the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea; and the second source was via the lengthy Ho Chi Minh Trail that connected the supply lines from North Vietnam. This trail winds through Laos and Cambodia and re-enters territories of South Vietnam at various key points near major military bases or cities.
Russian & Chinese Communist support routes into
South Vietnam via the coastline and Ho Chi Minh Trail
Although United States military training, military equipment, and technological advances in each of the branches of military service were far superior to that of the communists, the U.S. was best prepared at the time for defense against missiles and nuclear threats (of the Soviets and China); and the North Vietnamese therefore fought with guerilla tactics as a successful countermeasure against the greater strength of their enemy. These realities were not truths that President Nixon wanted to hear from his military advisors, and therefore they were excluded by the President from most Presidential briefings and decision-making.
POLICY FAILURES: INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE WHITE HOUSE TO THE CONGRESS/SENATE AND AMERICAN PUBLIC. As Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam, Admiral Zumwalt and other key U.S. and coalition military leaders in the South East Asian region noted that initial U.S. preparation and continued engagement in the war in the same way was not effective nor advisable. Furthermore, in contrast to the inaccurate information provided by the White House to the American people daily, clearly U.S. forces were not provided with Executive policies and overall strategies to appropriately engage in assemetrical warfare rather than "conventional" warfare; and these inadequcies previously led (and continued to lead) to inability to engage in tactics that would likely be successful in contrast to engaging in tactics that continued to prove ineffectual. This lack of honesty, especially egregious by President Nixon, had the outcome of lack of budget approved for appropriate additional training for military personnel; misuse of military personnel; overspending on high-end "conventional" military products and services; and lack of basic equipment and supplies for what was actually needed by military forces.
GUERRILLA TACTICS IN AN ASSEMMETRICAL WAR. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas were highly successful in confusing the U.S. miltary personnel by embedding with the Vietnamese civilian population in villages and provinces. With Vietnam's long history of struggle against occupation (by China, then as a French colony, by Japan during World War II, then attempts to re-acquire it by the French again) the Communist Party had ample time to perfect their resistence efforts and develop highly effective guerilla tactics in their own homeland.
SECRET UNDERGROUND TUNNELS. As part of the military effort and expertise honed from the 1940s onward in war-time the North Vietnamese communists created a well-established secret underground tunnel network system running the full length of the country through north and south, and this also extended into regions of Laos and Cambodia (where for a time U.S. troops were not permitted). This tunnel system was often several levels in depth and provided all the major base-camp needs of troops coming together for rest and recovery, acquiring new orders, exchanging information through spy networks, and troop movements.
Communist troops remained in these tunnels through most of the day and more typically only came out at night to ambush their enemies in the jungles, marshes, deltas, as well as along the river and coastal water-ways that served as the primary transportation system of the Vietnamese populace. In addition to permitting access points from which to attack their enemies, these routes proved to be useful avenues for stealing food along these corridors. Although highly rustic circumstances, life underground for the communist troops provided considerable benefits. These included: Barracks and safe quarters for resting and sleeping; hidden protected sectors for cooking, hot meals, and eating without being detected by the enemy; plentiful food storage areas; confidential rooms that served as high-security meeting locations and combat command centers; interrogation areas as well as reserved rooms dedicated to sophisticated technological intelligence gathering; communications systems; rendezvous points for spies; weapons and ammunition caches; latrines; bathing areas; theaters for troop entertainment and morale boosting; and even clinical and surgical medical care areas. These underground facilities baffeled U.S. military personnel for years as U.S. soldiers and sailors would only see a fleeting image of a sniper who suddenly disappeared entirely and mysteriously within the jungle terrain or along the coastal waters. Even when a few tunnel entry points were discovered (in their carefully camoflaged states) their convoluted mazes, booby traps, deadly snakes tied or nailed to the interiors as guardians, and the trip wires for mines, granades, and release of sharpened bamboo punji sticks all were carefully designed to deter and maim intruders.
Although courageous U.S. Army specialists -- referred to as tunnel rats -- explored North Vietnamese tunnels with only a 45 caliber sidearm and a flashlight when military units could find entry points, the more frequent course of action for U.S. and South Vietnamese forces relied on either bombing tunnel entry/exit points that could be located or FIRE???? However, given the extensiveness of tunnels throughout Vietnam, these minor cave-ins that occurred by initiating these explosions by U.S. or South Vietnamese troops proved to be inconsequential as there were countless multiple connections, entries, and exits across South Vietnam, North Vietnam, as well as Cambodia, and Laos. As an example of the size and extensiveness of these tunnels they were so expansive that the populations of whole villages sometimes also hid in them when the shelling in their area became too intense. FIRE?
Camoflaged North Vietnamese underground tunnel systems extended throughout Vietnam.
Admiral Zumwalt Redefines & Restructures the Roles of the Navy in the Vietnam War
When Admiral Zumwalt took command over U.S. Naval Forces of Vietnam, the war was in a stalemate and U.S. mililtary morale (inclusive of that of Navy personnel) was at its lowest. There rarely seemed an opportunity to actually engage the enemy in any "conventional" war method where the superior training and technology of the United States excelled; whereas, the North Vietnamese strategy of maiming the enemy proved to be very effective in creating situations where Americans, coalition partners, and South Vietnamese Army personnel became preoccuped with extracting the injured rather than finding or fighting them. But with U.S. military leadership constrained in countless ways by the micromanagement directly by the White House, they were functioning as if they had "one hand tied behind their backs." It was Presidents Johnson and Nixon that determined target selection, units deployed, date of every operation, the precise locations where this would occur, timing during the day, and detailed actions engaged in. Therefore, Admiral Zumwalt concentrated not on what he and the U.S. Navy didn't have control over but instead what they did have control over within a very flawed circumstance.
NAVY HEALTHCARE AND HUMANITARIAN-AID ENHANCES COMMUNITY-BUILDING AND PROMOTES TRUST. The situation for the South Vietnamese people was a daunting one as it is for those affected directly by war in all such scenarios. Their country's history reflects periods of independence alternativing with conquest and acquisition that began with a thousand-year rule by China, then the French, Japanese, interests of the French again, and currently the agressive action by the communists sponsored and supported by the Soviets and China as reflected in the Vietnam War. Vietnam's militarily strategic location in the East, its raw materials in North Vietnam, and its agricultural richness in South Vietnam were -- and have been -- the attractions and the resources sought by others by violence. Working on behalf of a nation that suffered the ravages of war for generations, the U.S. found it difficult to develop and build local relationships with the people in order to faciliate trust and earn the "the hearts and minds" of a cautious segment of the South Vietnamese population. Further complicating the matter, the communists employed tactics based on intimidation, fear, and terrorism as constant reminders and evidence that each family member must comply with their orders and expectations. A standard practice of the communists focused on abducting young men for forced military service (even those as young as 12), and often included torture, rape, or murder one or all family members -- women, the elderly, the disabled, and children -- in order to coerce compliance. Villagers experienced occupiers from two sides and numerous countries; and although most South Vietnamese people understood the good intentions of the Americans and their coalition partners who were personally sacrificing to support their freedom and independence, ultimately their day-to-day ordinary lives and the lives of their family members were dependent upon finding a way to cope with the actions and consequences of their own actions and family loyalties. An inability to sometimes determine who was friend and who was foe proved to be equally challenging for U.S. military personnel, and for this reason dispensing U.S. Navy healthcare provided an avenue of community-building and alliance that clearly and effectively demonstrated genuine care, concern, and good intent by the United States for the South Vietnamese people.
As part of the community-building effort and humanitarian initiatives in South Vietnam, U.S. Navy nurses, physicians, hospital-corps personnel, and other U.S. Navy medical specialists and logistical personnel provided much needed daily medical services in isolated rural areas, local provinces, as well as in city hospitals of South Vietnam. Their fundamental but important tasks likewise included purifying water, controlling insect populations, and distributing nutritional food to refugees fleeing areas of conflict. The U.S. Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) partnered together to effectively fulfill these common objectives, and the Navy formed the back-bone of its effectivenss. Under Admiral Zumwalt's direction, the Navy provided the vast majority of healthcare personnel to Vietnam; and this included an extensive array of specialized medical providers as well as the organizational and logistical success of joint-operational efforts, an efficient structured process, the employment of air and sea emergency services to increase survivability, in addition to the air-sea supply transportation to ensure it remained a reality.
In addition to these multiple levels and models of healthcare, two large U.S. Navy hospital ships rotated from coastal points in the South to provide the best of medical specialists and cutting-edge medical technologies to war-torn areas. In doing so they served the needs of both military and civilian casualties that occurred not only from combat situations or disease but also by terrorism inflicted on the populations by the Viet Cong guerillas who indescriminately bombed the provincial open markets, bars, theaters and any location where they believed U.S. personnel or their sympathizes might be found. Additionally, these ships provided medical care to those who had been the victims of Viet Cong guerillas -- who erected booby traps throughout the jungle, delta, and coastal areas to impale individuals or trigger explosions by any unsuspecting passer-by -- be it military personnel, a villager taking extra goods to the market, or a child playing.
The medical personnel aboard U.S. hospital ships equally served U.S. military, our coalition partners, and the South Vietnamese population. These ships provided a safe location in the most ever-changing impacted areas for this treatment; and two helicopter pads on deck provided a means of transport and delivery of casualties that proved both rapid and highly efficient. These medical ship personnel served those suffering from wounds, injuries, malaria, internal parasites, leeches, dystentery and illnesses of every type, as well as controlled skin fungai and jungle rot. They also provided complex surgeries, preventive care, and innoculations for adults and children. For many of the South Vietnamese people, this American healthcare was the first healthcare they and their family members had ever received.
Many U.S. Navy medical personnel also served directly with Marine combat units throughout the jungles, deltas, and coastal regions, and they were fully immersed in the most hostile war conditions of Vietnam. As additional contributions, a significant portion of the Search and Rescue and medical helicopter (medevac) teams -- including their pilots -- were those of the Navy. In these roles they provided emergency medical services and transport under intense direct fire from the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong as they treated the wounded, injured, and sick of all U.S. and coalition military branches, South Vietnamese government partners, and the South Vietnamese civilian and refugee populations.
Being both a visionary and bold by nature, Admiral Zumwalt demonstrated his understooding of the complexities, conditions, and "the new reality." He further defined and developed other new ways of utilizing U.S. Navy forces. He relied heavily on the unique qualities and expanded capabilities and skill-sets that he ordered to be established in Navy SEALS; and he coupled this strategy with the innovative addition of the "Brown Water Navy" that was composed of swift-boats patroling the coasts, harbors, rivers, and estuaries of Vietnam (later also including Cambodia and Laos).
U.S. Navy's Elite SEAL Warriors Integrate Comprehensive Skill-Sets
World War II and the Korean War Navy maritime specialists included U.S. Navy "frogmen" in Underwater Demolition Teams. Their missions were concentrated on transporting explosives underwater to their targets (bridges, ships, etc.), setting the explosive charges, and ensuring their objectives were successful in order to eliminate key infrastructures of our war-time adversaries.
At the beginning of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, President John Kennedy (having served as a Commanding Officer of a Navy PT boat) established his vision that outlined the concept of creating a Special Forces component of the Navy. The training to meet that objective evolved as a gradual process transitioning members of the Underwater Demolition Team into the role of the SEALS that we know today. This new designation as SEALS referred to their advanced highly skilled capabilities not only in Sea, but also equally in Air and Land based operations. This training expanded to develop elite Navy warriors in unconventional warfare to better fit U.S. military needs in Vietnam and beyond.
The intensive training of SEALS metamorphisized their units during the Vietnam War to become specialists not only on and in the water, but also in guerilla tactics thereby increasing their warfare flexiblity. They honed their skills in hand-to-hand combat, under-water operations, high-altitude parachuting, reconnasance, intelligence, clandestine operations, sniper expertise, language translation, as well as the "soft" social and communication skills necessary for negotiating and working effectively with diverse civilian populations and cultures. This vast array of comprehensive skill-sets that are requisite for every SEAL not only sets these individuals apart as an elite force within the Navy but also among other U.S. Special Operations teams. Special Ooperations units of each of the branches of service bring their own unique strengths and traditions. The Navy set encompasses an equal measure of these exceptional skills: High intellect; strong psychologaical resilience and fitness; the highest caliber of professionalism and proficiency in many specialties; creativity and innovation; out-of-the-box thinking; adaptability in every situation and terrain; confidence in extreme circumstances; close teamwork; selflessness; and courage.
Admiral Zumwalt employed SEAL team members to their full capabilities (and fostered training that even further enhanced these skill-sets). He realized their potential positive impact, and therefore he increased their numbers as well. One of the downfalls of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam up to that point had been U.S. intelligence-gathering which was all too often either missing entirely or highly inaccurate; and therefore, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering became initial focalpoints for SEALS for their own sensitive operations.
With their stealthy skills, accurate intelligence became a reality not only for their own operations but also for joint-operations that included all branches of U.S. forces as well as served as contributions to our other coalition members and the South Vietnamese forces. As part of this effort, SEALS proved their clandestine adeptness in rapid insertion and exiting from the jungles of Vietnam by water, helicopter, and swift boats in conditions and operations that were of extremely high risk and high priority. Often their duties were associated with high value targets, and rescue of our own.
You're not here
to survive this...
you're here to take charge of it
U.S. Navy SEALS Motto
Under Admiral Zumwalt's command SEALS functioned in small-units. These were typically composed of one officer, 6 enlisted specialists, and 2 South Vietnamese commandos. Their missions were exclusively of a highly classified nature; and they operated with considerable autonomy that frequently encompassed every aspect of their training.
Strategizing from a conviction that Navy personnel are the Navy's best and most critical asset, Admiral Z integrated holistic measures to reduce combat fatigue and supported mental fitness of not only Navy personnel in general but also for SEALS specifically. He accomplished this by deploying these SEAL warriors on a rotational basis on Temporary Additional Duty of approximately 6 month duration (with multiple deployments). Thus, even with these mentally tough warriors, Admiral Z was keenly aware of the toll that not only deployments have on individuals and families but also of the added toll (and need for balance) that occurs in the most continuous high pressure high risk environments. With these innovative approaches, SEALS became their own psychological weapon by reputation -- a warrior elite well known and feared by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong communists.